

# Models of Metropolitan Regionalism: A Comprehensive View\*

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- **Abstract:**

This paper attempts to present a classification based on different views on models and strategies of regionalism by a three tiers hierarchy of analysis (models, approaches and theories) that encompass greater part of them in a new one. This new presentation clarifies forms of regionalism in connection with different known classifications used in preparation of present paper as source. Useful figures prepared to illustrate main selected forms of regionalism in relation to different views on models, strategies and approaches and theories make more clear classifications than previous cases.

- **Key words:** Metropolitan Regionalism, Political Fragmentation, Metropolitan Government, Governance,

- **Introduction**

According to metropolitan government theorists, political fragmentation is the main governance challenges that city regions face (Barlow, 1991; Hamilton, 1999; Henton, 2001; Lefever, 2001). Political or governmental fragmentation is a problem resulted from the scale of metropolitan functional regions that expand beyond traditional political jurisdictions and encompass many cities, towns and counties. In other hand, there are several strategies or approaches each include different form of metropolitan government for coping with political fragmentation. All attempts against that challenge can be called Regionalism.

Review of relevant literature on various forms of regionalism such as Walker, 1999; Sybert, 1999; Miller 2002; Hamilton 1999; Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Barlow, 1991; that have attempted to classify different kinds of strategies and models of regional/metropolitan government based on specific criteria don't offer a clear concept of the whole.

It seems that discussions on metropolitan regionalism can be organized within a three-tier level hierarchy of study and analysis (models, approaches and strategies and theories). For this reason, present paper uses a three-tier hierarchy of analysis including models of regionalism (first tier), approaches and strategies (second tier) and theories (third tier) (see below figure). At the first, attempts of paper focus on examination of four typology of regionalism (Hamilton, 1999; Sybert, 1999; Walker, 1999; Miller, 2002) in order to recognize different classifications on metropolitan regionalism and their criteria of categorizing.

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At the next step, based on typology provided, 10 significant models /forms of regionalism (according to their frequencies in considered sources) is presented within a spectrum, from the most intensive, strongest and hardest to the most weakest, loosely and easiest form of regionalism (first tier).at the second step, examination focus on different kind of approaches and strategies that, in fact, are encompassing all models described at the first tier. In other word, each of models can be seen as integral parts of an approach or can be classified as a policy of an upper level strategy accepted for coping with political fragmentation.

In final step, paper attempt to discuss about theories that can explain existing dominant extremes trends (regionalism/anti-regionalism) in governing metropolitan areas. As a synthesis, paper present an encompassing figure including 10 discussed models, also approaches / strategies and theories explaining them in a spectrum that *government and governance* as opposing concepts are in its two extremes. Naturally, some models are closed to government and some are near to governance. In one extreme, whatever takes distance from *x*-axis of figure, regionalism intensity gets higher (see figure no1).

### Figure No (1): Three-tier Hierarchy of Analysis

1. (Specification of) significant models of metropolitan regionalism (based on examination of different classification of metropolitan regionalism, <i>Regionalism typology</i> ).
2. (Presenting) approaches and strategies encompassing different models.
3. (Discussion on) theories explaining regionalism/anti-regionalism

- **Four Perspective on Typology of Metropolitan Regionalism**

This parts of paper aim at providing materials for preparing first-tier of analysis, selection of main models/types of regional/metropolitan regionalism. Several significant sources on typology of regionalism such as, Hamilton, 1999; Sybert, 1999; Miller, 2002; Walker, 1999; were reviewed in order to recognize different type of regionalism. Introducing typology is done for selecting significant models/types of regionalism according their frequencies and implied importance in reviewed literature on regionalism typologies. Different models and classes of regionalism (four typologies) are resented in a two axis figures (*x* and *y*). In one extreme of *y*-axis, there is government (as a way of governing), and in other opposite side we can put governance. Again, in one extreme of *x*-axis we can see high intensity models of regionalism and conversely. So, models of regionalism in these figures are organized in a spectrum (from high intensity to low intensity of regionalism).

#### Hamilton's Typology

According to Hamilton (1999, 31-37), all regionalism attempts are in fact political responses to metropolitan growth pressures. He argues that, as urban areas grow, pressures are extended on local government systems to accommodate the growth. Two types of basic political responses to urban development have influenced the governmental organization of urban areas. One response is to foster a centralised governing system, and the other is to foster a decentralized governing system. Decentralization responses are categorized as those responses that create or foster a polycentric local government system of small and independent local government and numerous regional special districts in metropolitan areas. Centralization responses are those that encourage consolidation of political structures under one or only a few local governments.

Another approach for studying and analyzing the responses to growth based on Hamilton's view is to categorize the various responses as to whether they promote centralized or decentralized government structure and governance. Government structure is narrowly defined for categorization purpose as general-purpose local government—cities, towns, and municipalities with elected bodies responsible for provision of local government services to resident. The term *governance* is not concerned with government structure per se but with government process and functions. Governance is a functional and issue-oriented approach to addressing problems of a regional nature...by differentiating governance and government structure; one is able to study the interrelationship between the extent of governmental structure fragmentation and the extent of regional governance in metropolitan areas. The framework, then, consist of two categories of centralization (government structure and governance) and two categories of decentralization responses (see box, no 1). According to the above framework four main responses categories are:

- *Decentralized government structure responses*
- *Centralized government structure responses*
- *Decentralized governance responses*
- *Centralized governance responses*


Centralizing responses simplify government structure and governance by reducing duplication and by promoting the establishment of process to address regional problems. Decentralized structural responses are those that promote a polycentric system of government with political control in metropolitan areas vested in a multiplicity of small general-purpose governments. Decentralized governance responses are limited accommodations to protect and allow this polycentric system of small genera-purpose governments to retain their independence and autonomy. Decentralized responses would include centralizing certain functions in regional single-purpose districts as necessary to take advantages of economies of scale if this did not jeopardize the basic autonomy of the local government.

**BOX NO 1: Hamilton's Typology of Metropolitan Regionalism (Responses to Metropolitan Growth and Change)**

<b>Centralization Responses</b>	<b>Government Structure</b> Annexation and mergers City-county consolidation Two-tier metropolitan government	<b>Governance</b> Urban County Consolidation of function Regional governance process Regional tax sharing Multipurpose metropolitan district Regional coordinating agencies Federal and state grant and policies Encouraging regionalism
<b>Decentralization Responses</b>	Suburban development Easy incorporation law Addition if different forms of general-purpose government	Single-purpose district Inter-local agreement Privatization Federal and state grants and policies Supporting fragmentation Regional council with no authority

SOURCES :( Hamilton, 1999)

Figure No (2): Regionalism spectrum according to Hamilton



### Sybert's Typology

Sybert (1999) distinguish four main categories in metropolitan regionalism. He reviews four models and example of regional government: (1) one-level; (2) two-level ;( 3) cooperative; and (4) metropolitan council.

The *one-level* alternative can be accomplished by three basic techniques :( 1) Annexation (the absorption of nearly unincorporated territory) ;( 2) Municipal consolidation (merger of two or more incorporated units) ;(3) City-county consolidation (the union of one or more municipality with the county government).

The *two-level* alternative of regional reorganizations is based on the theory of federalism. With this technique, area-wide functions are delegated to area-wide government, while purely local functions remain with the local units, creating a two-tier system. The two-tier system can take three basic forms: (1) Metropolitan district (a governmental unit that perform one or a few closely related functions in all or a substantial part of metropolitan area) ;( 2) Comprehensive urban county plan (the simultaneous transfer of selected functions from municipalities and other local units to the county government) ;( 3) Federation (the establishment of a new area-wide government that is assigned new responsibilities region-wide).

The *cooperative* alternative model of regional government, also referred to as *inter-local agreements*, call for greater cooperation between existing governments without the creation of new one. This approach represents voluntary techniques to address regional problems while maintaining local control. Agreement can take the following basic forms:(1) A single government performs a service or provides a facility for one or more other local units, *inter-local service agreements* ;(2) Two or more local government administers a function or operates a facility on a joint basis, *joint-power agreements* ;(3) Two or more local governments assist or supply mutual aid to one another in emergency situations.


A fourth category of regional or metropolitan government is the *metropolitan council*. Metropolitan councils are permanent associations of governments that meet on a regular basis to discuss and seek agreement on various issues. However, because of its lack of authority, the council mechanism cannot be classified as a true metropolitan government.

**BOX NO 2: Sybert's Typology of Metropolitan Regionalism**

<b>One-level alternative</b> Annexation Municipal consolidation City-county consolidation	<b>Two-level alternative</b> Metropolitan district Comprehensive urban county plan Federation	<b>Metropolitan council alternative</b>	<b>Cooperative alternative</b> Inter-local service agreement Joint-power agreement Informal cooperation
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SOURCES :( Sybert, 1999)

**Figure No (3): Regionalism spectrum according to Sybert**



**Walker's Typology**

Walker in its article with the title of *“From Metropolitan Cooperation to Governance”* explains increasing need for metro approach (Regionalism). According to walker’s view, today, more metro areas exist than ever before; more people live in metro areas than previous; metro government political fragmentation is continuing; metro diversity is ever increasing; there is an advisory disharmony (lack of an agreed theory on metropolitan governing); federal and state aid is reducing.

He argue that these trends point to regionalism as a solution because it can (a) handle certain functions on a multi-jurisdictional basis, (b) achieve economies of scale in providing various services by broadening the basis of fiscal support and the demand for certain services, (c) handle spillover servicing problems caused by rapid urban population growth and sometimes decline, and (d) confront the necessity for retrenchment by seeking more effective ways of rendering public services.


Regionalism according to walker’s used metaphor is a gold mine for officials seeking to solve local problems, and 17 different miners may be put to work to extract the gold. These 17 approaches to regional service problem can be arrayed on a spectrum from the easiest to the hardest-from the most politically feasible, least controversial, and sometimes least effective to the politically least feasible, most threatening to local officials, and sometimes most effective, at least in the opinion of many in jurisdictions that have made these fairly radical reforms (see the box below).

**BOX NO 3: Walker's Typology of Metropolitan Regionalism (Regional Approaches to Service Delivery)**

<b>EASIEST</b>	<b>Middling</b>	<b>Hardest</b>
Informal cooperation	Local special districts	One-tier consolidation
Inter- local service contract	Transfer of functions	Two-tier restructuring
Joint-power agreement	Annexation	Three-tier reforms
Extra territorial power	Regional special district and authorities	
Regional council	Metro multipurpose district	
Federally encouraged single-purpose regional bodies	Reformed urban county	
State planning and development district		
Contracting (private)		

SOURCES :( Walker, 1999)

**Figure No (4): Regionalism spectrum according to Walker**



**Miller's Typology**

Miller suggests that there are four broad forms of metropolitan regionalism. The first form is *coordinating regionalism* and deals with the integrated planning of the region as a whole and the consistency of local municipal strategic plan of the region. The second form is probably the most prevalent, *administrative regionalism*. It comes in two primary forms- the functional transfer of services from municipal government to either special districts or to county government and the day-to-day negotiation between all types of local government that lead to a myriad of cooperation agreement at an operational level between those governments.

The third form is *fiscal regionalism*. This form represent a set of cooperative strategies that recognize the governmental structure of the existing configuration of local government but create metropolitan regional funding mechanism for a wide variety of public purposes. As such, they are relatively recent innovations in metropolitan cooperation. There are three broad type of fiscal regionalism: cultural asset districts, tax-revenue sharing programs, and peaceful coexistence plans.


The fourth form is *structural regionalism*. This form deals with changing the boundaries of one or more existing units of local government. There are three types of structural regionalism: annexation, city-county consolidation, and mergers/consolidation (of municipalities).

**BOX NO 4: Miller's Typology of Metropolitan Regionalism (Approaches to Regionalism)**

<b>Coordinating Regionalism</b>	<b>Administrative Regionalism</b>	<b>Fiscal Regionalism</b>	<b>Structural Regionalism</b>
Ad hoc region	The rise of the regional special district	Tax-base sharing	Annexation
Advisory region	The emerging urban county	Cultural asset districts	City-county consolidation
Supervisory region	Inter- local agreement	Peaceful coexistent strategies	Mergers and consolidations
Authoritative region			

SOURCES :( Miller, 2002)

**Figure No (5): Regionalism spectrum according to Miller**



- **Ten Significant Models of Regionalism**

**Annexation**

Annexation refers to the process by which territory of one local government is switched to another local government. Although annexation may occur from incorporated municipality to another, its most general application now is between an unincorporated area and an incorporated municipality (Miller, 2002, 110).

Structural regionalism <i>(Miller)</i>		
Middling regionalism <i>(Walker)</i>	<b>Annexation</b>	One-level alternative <i>(Sybert)</i>
Centralized government responses <i>(Hamilton)</i>		

**Municipal merger**

Mergers and consolidation occur when two or more municipalities combine to become a single municipality (Ibid, 123).

Structural regionalism <i>(Miller)</i>		
One-tier consolidation: Hardest regionalism <i>(Walker)</i>	<b>Municipal merger</b>	One-level alternative <i>(Sybert)</i>
Centralized government responses <i>(Hamilton)</i>		

### City- county consolidation

According to Hamilton (1999, 95) when the city expands its boundaries to coincide with the county, absorbing all unincorporated territory and many, if not all, of the county function. In other word, a city-county consolidation is exactly that –the government of the city and of the county are combined into a single government (Miller, 2002, 122).

Structural regionalism <i>(Miller)</i>		
One-tier consolidation: Hardest regionalism <i>(Walker)</i>	<b>City- county consolidation</b>	One-level alternative <i>(Sybert)</i>
Centralized government responses <i>(Hamilton)</i>		

### Metropolitan government (federation)

Hamilton(1999,99) argue that when reformers realized that city-county consolidation in most large metropolitan areas would not achieve comprehensive government, because of scale of metropolitan areas that extended beyond the county borders, advocated a federated metropolitan government as an alternative to city –county consolidation.

This kind of regionalism, according to Walker (1999, 159), seeks a division between local and regional function with two level of government.

Two-tier restructuring: Hardest regionalism <i>(Walker)</i>		
<b>Metropolitan Government (Federation)</b>	Two-level alternative <i>(sybert)</i>	
Centralized government responses <i>(Hamilton)</i>		

### The urban county

Under a comprehensive urban county plan, a county assures those functions that are determined to be area-wide in nature, while the municipalities continue to administer those functions considered to be of purely local concern. Thus the county is transformed into a metropolitan government, with the reallocation of a variety of functions from all municipalities to the county (Sybert, 1999, 175).

Administrative regionalism <i>(Miller)</i>		
Middling regionalism <i>(Walker)</i>	<b>The urban county</b>	Two-level alternative <i>(Sybert)</i>
Centralized government responses <i>(Hamilton)</i>		

### Special district

Special district is a generic term for state or locally created district, agencies, authorities, and commissions that provide a public service and be governed by a board that is popularly elected or appointed by public officials with reporting requirements to the public. In order to qualify an organization as a special district, an organization must exist as a publicly organized entity, usually as a corporation with the power to sue, be sued, make contract, and so on. A special district must have substantial fiscal and administrative independencies (Hamilton, 1999, 178). Special districts,

according to their function's scope (purpose) and extent of spatial coverage (level) are divided into four categories as below box shows:

**Figure No ( ): different type of special districts**

purpose	level	Multi- Purpose	Single- Purpose
<b>Local</b>		Local multi- purpose districts	Local special districts
<b>Metropolitan</b>		Multi- purpose metropolitan district	Metropolitan districts

### Metropolitan district

The term metropolitan district is often used to designate district that cover one or more counties. Even though metropolitan districts may provide only one or more closely related functions, they provide a regional focus for that function (Hamilton, 1999, 181).

Administrative regionalism (Miller)		
Middling regionalism (Walker)	Metropolitan district	Two-level alternative (Sybert)
Centralized governance responses (Hamilton)		

### Tax-base sharing

According to Miller (1999, 2000) tax-base sharing as a form of fiscal regionalism creates the fiscal equivalent of a regional government without the regional government. Tax-base sharing is a simple idea: take a regional resource of revenue, such as the property tax or sales tax, and distribute the proceeds to constituent local government on objective criteria that reflect the needs of region.

Fiscal regionalism (Miller)		
Tax-base sharing		
Centralized governance responses (Hamilton)		

### Regional or metropolitan council

Regional councils are cooperative, regional organization composed of counties, towns, and often special districts. The purpose of regional councils is to increase communication, cooperation, and coordination among local governments in planning and implementing programs that address regional issues.

Coordinating regionalism (Miller)		
Easiest regionalism (Walker)	Regional /Metropolitan council	Metropolitan council alternative (Sybert)
Decentralized governance responses (Hamilton)		

### Formal/Informal cooperation

The cooperative alternative of regionalism call for greater cooperation between existing governments without the creation of new one. This approach represents a voluntary technique to address regional problems while maintaining local control. Inter- jurisdictional cooperation is a broad concept with numerous variations. These range from verbal (informal) agreements which may consist merely of the exchange of information, to formal agreement that relate to specific functions or services (Sybert, 1999, 178).

The three major kinds of voluntary formal cooperation in service delivery are *inter-local service agreement*, *joint-powers agreement*, and *contracting with the private or nonprofit sectors* (Hamilton, 1999; Walker, 1999).

Administrative regionalism (Miller)		
Easiest regionalism (Walker)	<b>Formal/Informal cooperation</b>	Cooperative regionalism (Sybert)
Decentralized governance responses (Hamilton)		

- **Approaches and Strategies Encompassing Models**

In the second-tier of analysis, as noted earlier, we attempted to present approaches (Savitch and Vogel, 2000) and strategies (Barlow, 1991) comparable and corresponding with each other's, inferred from real world models/type of regionalism, encompassing and reducing them to a few number. Each approaches and strategies correspond with some models that explained in previous section. In other word, taking an approach or strategy of regionalism needs acceptance and implementing a series of regionalism models. Parallel use of these two terms, approach and strategy, for this section of analysis, refer to used literature on this subject that one classify them *approaches (paths) to new regionalism* and other call them *strategies to resolve political fragmentation*.

Here, at the first stage, we discuss five approaches proposed by Savitch and Vogel (2000) in their article with the title of *paths to new regionalism*. At the next, we try to provide a comparison between them and five strategies presented by Barlow for resolving political fragmentation. According to Savitch and Vogel (2000) there are five approaches to regionalism: (1) The "Consolidationist" Approach (2) The "Multitiered" Approach (3) The "Linked Functions" Approach (4) The "Complex Networks" Approach (5) The "Public Choice" Approach

#### **The "Consolidationist" Approach**

Traditional notions of government can be seen in what has come to be known as the "consolidationist" approach. For consolidationists, the solution lies in eliminating independent municipalities within a county and replacing them with a single government. They are therefore better able to deal with segregation, income disparities, and the ever-growing problem of sprawl by pooling tax resources to build integrated housing, redistribute wealth, and regulate land use. Earlier advocates of consolidation believed bigger government could exploit economies of scale and give citizens cheaper, more effective government.

The issue also arises about whether consolidated government can forever chase sprawl. There is, too, the vexing problem of how far consolidation (and annexation) can go without losing the ideal of local government. Given the political barriers facing consolidation, the recent studies questioning its benefits and the limits of local elasticity, consolidation may not be the most effective route toward New Regionalism. Nevertheless, it may be appropriate for small cities, and it has some appeal in medium sized cities. As an idea, it is simple, straightforward, and makes good press copy.

#### **The "Multitiered" Approach**

Multitiered government is another way in which the agenda of New Regionalism can also be achieved. The metropolitan tier is fashioned by law and either supplants or supplements some of the operations of preexisting governments. A tiered approach is more agile than consolidation, because it allows for some problems to be managed at their most appropriate and most local level and for regional problems to be addressed by a metropolitan authority. Multitiered government does not so much establish "lower" or "higher" levels of authority but different governments designed to deal with "narrow" and "wide" kinds of issues. Ideally, small jurisdictions should be able to manage labor intensive services, which call for close relationships between service deliverers and citizen consumers.

Police, sanitation, and housing services are typical “street-level” bureaucracies (Lipsky 1980). By comparison, the metropolitan tier is supposed to better deal with issues that cut across a number of local jurisdictions or involve redistributive policies. Environmental problems, solid waste disposal, tax pooling, and transportation are generally regarded to be within the metropolitan sphere.

Although this type of government may appear to reconcile divergent objectives between localism and regionalism, it has its problems. For one, efforts to impose regional solutions on “locals” have met resistance: small cities dislike being told they must accept an unwanted incinerator or low-income housing for the good of the metropolis. For another, metropolitan governments have been vetoed by state or provincial authorities, presumably for overstepping their bounds... Thus, metropolitan tiers often find themselves crushed between the grindstones of local and higher levels of government.

### **The “Linked Functions” Approach**

The concept of “linked functions” (that is, functional consolidation, or interlocal service agreements) between a single city and its county is included under the rubric of governance in New Regionalism. Usually, the link is between a select numbers of services (e.g., economic development or solid waste disposal). Some localities may take this further with an array of services and arrangements for tax sharing.

Unlike consolidation or multitiered systems, linked functions are flexible and require no new levels of government. Over a period of time, functions can be added, deleted, or shifted between governments. Linked functions also preserve local autonomy and the efficiency of a medium-sized central city while being able to exploit economies of scale associated with larger counties. Their flexibility, however, is offset by a certain amount of instability. Citizens may view linked functions as a “Band-aid,” because they are not comprehensive. Moreover, local elites (particularly civic and business boosters) may see functional consolidation as an incomplete step and as something less than political consolidation.

### **The “Complex Networks” Approach**

Another route to New Regionalism lies in the notion of “complex networks.” This approach is closest to the ideal of *governance* without *government*. Its advocates envision large numbers of independent governments (voluntarily) cooperating through multiple, overlapping webs of interlocal agreements. A large number of horizontal connections among localities are emphasized. Numerous jurisdictions with overlapping services mean that citizens can seek out the most optimal arrangements for each particular circumstance and in the process develop complex networks. In short, jurisdictions with overlapping services are not necessarily duplicative but can be quite purposeful. Complexity is a good thing, because it maximizes choice and citizen control. Governance of larger regions can occur organically, as a result of local preferences. In addition to the normal network of services, this perspective allows for tax sharing to address inequities as well as voluntary land-use controls and the public acquisition of land.

Complex networks, however, pose all the difficulties (e.g., incompleteness, instability) associated with linked functions. Moreover, self-direction may lead to *no* direction: an absence of comprehensive, agreed-upon objectives can lead to helter-skelter policies.

### **The “Public Choice” Approach**

Under the “public choice” approach, fragmentation is embraced, and there is little or no role for government (Tiebout 1956). According to public choice advocates, only the market rules and people express preferences by moving from one jurisdiction to another; that is, they “vote with their feet.” Local fragmentation is seen as a virtue because it ensures that governments will compete with one another, thereby enabling individuals to seek out an optimal package of services. However, state and federal mandates for regional cooperation to prevent sprawl or restore clean air undermine any “purist” notion of public choice, because some type of public coordination or regulation may, after all, be necessary.

Choice approaches have common roots in what has come to be called the polycentrism school; that is, both value local autonomy and diversity of choice and both share a distaste for hierarchy. However, the complex networks approach has faith in the capacity of interlocal cooperation to deal with regional issues, whereas the public choice school appears to discount coordinated public intervention


### Comparing/Contrasting Approaches

With the exception of the public choice approach, these types of government or governance represent efforts to address New Regionalism. As we see it, consolidation and multitiered approaches are closer to the “government model,” because they involve new layers of formalized, hierarchical rule. By contrast, linked government and complex networks use existing governments to establish horizontal cooperation and more informal approaches typical of the governance model.

Both government and governance offer arrange of alternatives with different advantages and emphases. Consolidation tries to cope with region wide inequities through democratic command and control. Multitiered systems attempt to balance centralization and decentralization by pluralistic methods; furthermore, this approach has the capacity to address environmental and service issues. Linked functions seek to resolve conflict among jurisdictions and emphasize areas of cooperation (such as planning). Under the complex networks approach, the natural interplay of local interests and consensus are seen as the best ways to reduce negative externalities, which may lead to greater efficiency.

Theoretically, public choice relies on individual decisions expressed in marketplace choices. Not all routes to New Regionalism are examined in this symposium, but the articles do show how different localities have struggled to meet challenges and the degree to which (and the reasons why) local governments are trying and testing new paths. Following figure illustrate intensity of regionalism among five approach described previous and their relation to government and governance. Box no 5 summaries Barlow five strategies of regionalism that are comparable and coinciding one by one with previous approaches.

Figure No (6): Regionalism Intensity among Different Approaches to Regionalism



#### BOX NO 5: Barlow's Five Strategies of Regionalism

Five strategies to resolve political fragmentation according to Barlow (1991):

1. *Consolidated government.* Creation of a single unit of government for a metropolitan area eliminates political fragmentation. The strategy is difficult to implement, owing to opposition from local politicians and residents. There is a danger that the needs and interests of localities within the metropolis may not be well served.
2. *Transfer of functions.* Public service pressure on local finance is reduced, allowing municipality to provide fewer but better services. Such transfers weaken local government by making it less important in public service provision and there is no guarantee that functions transferred will be organized effectively for the metropolitan area.
3. *Special-purpose authorities.* These can reduce problems related to the efficiency and effectiveness of public service since the size and configuration of authorities can be tailored to functional requirements. Providing special-purpose authorities dose ad to the number of government bodies in metropolitan area and may distance functions from community control, as well as making coordination between functions difficult.
4. *Inter-municipal co-operation.* Co-operation can reduce negative spillover effect and preserve municipal autonomy and identity, but can do little to address the problem of fiscal disparities. A major flaw is the voluntary basis of cooperation, which ends to be between municipalities of similar social, economic, cultural and fiscal character.
5. *Two-tier government.* Spillover and boundary problems are reduced and scale advantages gained by an area-wide upper tier of government, while small-scale democracy and local control can be retained and local needs met by the lower-tier units of government. The main difficulty lies in implementation and, in particular, in ensuring a good working relationship between the two levels of government.

SOURCES :( Barlow, 1991)

- **Seeking Theories on Regionalism**

It would be helpful for this discussion if there were a theory of local government. As a Mackenzie states, there is no theory of local government. There is no normative general theory from which we can deduce what local government ought to be; there is no positive general theory on which we can derive testable hypothesis. Benjamin asserts, the absence of theory must be identified as the major problem in the study of local government. Without theory, contradictory conclusions and policy recommendation may be reached, sometimes from the same data. Walker comments that perhaps the greatest weakness of local government today is the absence of a theory that describes roles of local government (Miller, 2002, 89).

Explanations for this absence of theory are plentiful. Syed suggests that there exists, on the one hand, a popular image of local government culturally traceable to Jeffersonian value of good republic built from the bottom up, and a more centric official image embodied in legal doctrine, on the other. Schambra sees these two images in a dialectic and contradiction extending back to the positions of the federalists and anti-federalists in the late18th century. Frug maintains that the American political system plays one image against the other based on changing values and fears. Mansbridge consider the former image as face-to-face or unitary democracy and the latter as pluralistic or adversarial democracy and that the inability to know and use the appropriate form of democracy in a particular context create a constant tension and an inability to resolve that tension(Ibid,90).Goldberg and Mercer argue that the high degree of American metropolitan political fragmentation reflect the more individualistic market orientation of the American political ethos and makes centralized metropolitan planning and management more difficult in the united state than Canada, where there is a great value placed on collective and government action (Rothblatt,1998,19)

Therefore, Miller (2002) argues that we don not have a theory of local government, but two theories. The first, he refer to as the *metropolitan region as an organic whole*, generally reflects the notion of a collective-rational approach to organizational design. The second, he refer to as the *polycentric region*, generally reflects an individualistic-rational approach to organizational design. Teaford (1997 ) call first approach, *metropolitanism* and second, *municipalism*. Lefevre (2001) use the terms of *supra-municipality* and *intermunicipality* in metropolitan government respectively. According to Lefevre, all the experiment in metropolitan government are situated between these two extreme modalities, to such an extent that it is sometimes difficult to place them in one category or another.

According to Lefevre (2001, 10), the main argument in favour of the constitution of metropolitan government has long been based on the need to make the urban institutional system correspond to the economic and social development of cities. The organic whole arguments supported by research on different economic and social field. Porter coins the term *cluster* to explain why and how business move to areas of low production cost, or field that enjoy competitive success through the geographic concentration of interconnected companies and institutions. Economic clusters generally do not follow geo-political boundaries. According to porter a new political structure is necessary to match the cluster structure of the global economy. That match is the metropolitan region (Miller, 2002, 91-93).

In social filed, David Rusk argues that decentralized local government structure and suburban growth pattern foster concentration of poverty. According to Rusk, de-concentration of poverty is a regional responsibility that requires regional institutions, particularly in the area of land use planning, fair-share housing plans, and revenue-sharing programs (Ibid).

Political and social arguments do not seem to be to the fore in the justification of the constitution of metropolitan governments. For example, although the idea of a metropolitan community appeared as early as the late 1960s in the United State, the argument that the existence of such a community should be reflected in the institutional system has rarely been expressed. On the other hand, the argument those large structures are more democratic because they offer fewer opportunities for a small group to take control (since they are more open to the political game), and the argument that political participation increase in relation to the power of local government, are advanced more often(Lefevre,2001,10).



According to Lefevre, all these statements, which are based on theory, have rarely been verified empirically. The supporters of *public choice school* have not hesitated to remind supporter of the *metropolitan model* of this. They have, for example, highlighted the difficulties of measuring economies of scale after setting up an area-wide structure of government; they have demonstrated the possibility of taking advantage of existing structure without recourse to such a heavy institutional form and have insisted on horizontal cooperation between local authorities as a substitute for metropolitan government. Some have criticized the undemocratic nature of the latter, drawing attention to the distance between local authorities and their citizens which resulted in the latter losing control of their elected representative. They denounced the monopoly of metropolitan government in many services because such a situation favours neither innovation nor a reduction in production costs. Moreover, basing their arguments on Tiebout's model, they accused the metropolitan model of not allowing individuals a free choice of localization.

It would be fruitless to look for objectivity in the two models put forward, because at base, they stem from different values and principles regarding the role and functions that governments unite should fulfill. Whilst certain supporters of the metropolitan model highlight the need for an overall view of the urban area and the rejection of institutional forms which favour differentiation, indeed, social segregation and insist on values such as solidarity and social equality, the public choice school defends the individual's right to choose, the accessibility and accountability of political representatives, and competition. Economic and political arguments overlap here with two traditional functions of local government: the role of service provider and the more social and political role of representing a community (Lefevre.2001, 11).

It seems that we can arrange all models and approaches of regionalism within these two extremes. At one side, there are models and approaches that are close to metropolitan models trying consolidate all government unites into a single or a few unite. In the other side, we can put models that attempt to establish formal/informal voluntarily mechanism for cooperation between different local governments.

Figure no 7 attempted to organize all models, approaches and two opposing theories in a coherent package as a spectrum.

Figures No (3): Theories, Approaches and Models of Government and Governance



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